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Abstract
We propose a new approach to identify the strength of the precautionary motive
and the extent of self-insurance in response to earnings risk based on Euler equation
estimates. To address endogeneity problems, we use Norwegian administrative data
and instrument consumption and earnings volatility with the variance of firm-specific
shocks. The instrument is valid because firms pass some of their productivity shocks
onto wages; moreover, for most workers firm shocks are hard to avoid. Our estimates
suggest a coefficient of relative prudence of 2, in a very plausible range.
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1 Introduction
We propose a new approach to identify the strength of the precautionary motive and the
extent of self-insurance in response to earnings risk based on empirical Euler equation es-
timates. As is well known (see e.g. Carroll, 1992), households who face income risk and
have a precautionary motive for saving accumulate wealth to cushion against rainy days
and sustain future consumption. One way to test for precautionary saving is to estimate
a consumption Euler equation, regressing consumption growth on the volatility of future
consumption growth:1
Δ ln cit = αV
c
it + β
′Xit + ζit, (1)
where cit is individual i ’s consumption, V
c
it consumption growth volatility conditional on
information at the beginning of the period, X ′it a vector of demographic controls and ζit
a consumption growth innovation. Under CRRA preferences, α equals 1/2 the coefficient
of relative prudence as defined by Kimball (1990) and thus identifies the strength of the
precautionary motive for saving.
2 Problems with and solutions to the Euler equation
approach
Dynan (1992) was one of the first to use (1) to identify the strenght of the precautionary
motive using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. The main problem is that V cit is
unobserved. Dynan solves it by estimating:
Δ ln cit = α (Δ ln cit)
2 + β′Xit + ζit, (2)
and instrumenting realized volatility in consumption growth (the term (Δ ln cit)
2) with a set
of socio-demographic variables that are known at time t−1 and presumably explain volatility
(such as education, occupation, etc.). She estimates a very small value of α, suggesting a
limited role for precautionary saving. The empirical problem with this approach is that the
selected instruments either lack power or may be good predictors of changes in the chosen
pattern of consumption (i.e., they violate the exclusion restriction). 2
1An alternative approach is to estimate reduced form savings equations or wealth equations using measures
of earnings volatility, as in Guiso et al. (1992).
2One solution to the problem of weak instruments, first proposed by Bertola et al. (2005), is to instrument
the realized variability of consumption growth with a measure of the subjective variance of future earnings
available in the Italian Survey of Households Income and Wealth. This approach results in an estimate of
2
An alternative approach is to proxy the unobserved conditional variance of consumption
growth (a sufficient statistic for all sources of risk faced) with income risk, which for most
people is the most relevant risk faced over the life cycle. The strength of this proxy depends
on the degree of self-insurance. Suppose that consumption risk V c originates from two
independent sources, the first related to labor income risk, V y, and the second, V η, reflecting
other sources of consumption risk arising for instance from shocks to consumption needs:
V cit = θV
y
it + V
η
it (3)
The parameter 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 maps income risk into consumption risk. A value of θ < 1 implies
partial self-insurance of labor income risk, either through accumulation of precautionary
assets or other sources of insurance, such as family risk sharing or formal access to credit or
insurance markets. We are interested in identifying both the strength of the precautionary
motive α as well as the extent of insurance against labor income risk θ. The latter is critical
to judge the adequacy of precautionary savings.
Using income risk as a proxy for the unobserved V cit leads to the estimation of a modified
Euler equation:
Δ ln cit = αV˜
y
it + β
′
Xit + uit, (4)
where V˜ yit is a measure of the observed residual variance of earnings faced by individual
i at time t (obtained from estimation of a statistical process for earnings in longitudinal
data). Since from (3) consumption volatility reflects the underlying volatility of individual
earnings, the latter is a natural candidate to proxy for the former; it is idiosyncratic and
can be measured. However, because a non-negligible part of measured earnings volatility
(as discussed in Fagereng et al., 2016) may reflect choice rather than risk, it may fail the
exogeneity requirement: it is an error-ridden measure of true earnings risk. To see this,
suppose that (residual) wage variance is:
V˜ yit = Hit + ρfFit (5)
where F is the variance of shocks to the firm the individual works for, ρf the (square) of the
pass-through of firms shocks to workers’ wages reflecting partial insurance within the firm,
and H the residual, non-firm related, earnings variance (e.g., the unobserved component of
human capital). However, assume that only a fraction ρh of H is truly risk, while the rest is
the prudence parameter of around 2, suggesting a strong precautionary motive. While useful, the problem
with this approach is that subjective probability distributions of future earnings are usually unavailable in
survey data. Furthermore, little is known on how much of the earnings risk that people face is actually
insured.
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variation in wages that reflects individual choice (or even statistical noise), rather than risk.
Hence:
V yit = ρhHit + ρfFit, (6)
implying that measured earnings risk is V˜ yit = V
y
it +εit, the sum of true risk and a measurement
error εit = (1− ρh) Hit. An OLS regression of Δcit on V˜ yit as in (4) thus yields:
p lim α̂ = αθ
ρhVH + ρ
2
fVF
VH + ρ2fVF
where VH = var(H), VF = var(F ) (see Appendix). This is a downward biased estimate of
α for two reasons: i) it ignores that some earnings volatility may reflect choice or noise (the
factor ρh); and ii) it mixes precautionary motive and self-insurance (the factor θ).
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Identification of the strength of the precautionary motive and of the self-insurance of
earnings risk requires separate identification of the two parameters α and θ; it also requires
solving the error-in-variable problem induced by the choice/noise issue. Our proposed solu-
tion is to follow Fagereng et al.’s (2016) methodology, match data on consumers with data on
their employers, and use the firm-specific variance of value added shocks (Fit in the notation
of equation 6) as an instrument for V˜ yit in equation (4), and as an instrument for realized con-
sumption volatility in equation (2). The instrument is valid because, as we document below,
firms pass some of their productivity shocks onto wages (i.e., there is only partial insurance
within the firm). Moreover, for most workers firm-related shocks cannot be manipulated and
are hard to avoid - that is they are a genuine source of risk.4 It can be shown that, under the
maintained assumptions, the resulting IV estimation of (4) provides a consistent estimate of
αθ, while IV estimation of (2) provides a consistent estimate of α (see Appendix). Hence,
comparison of estimates from the two models allows separate identificaton of α and θ.
3 Data
We use nearly 20 years of longitudinal administrative data on income and assets covering
the whole Norwegian population. Data are thus attrition-free except for mortality and
migration. A full description of the data is provided in Fagereng et al. (2016). Here we
summarize their main features. All data, including assets values and income from capital and
labor, are obtained from tax administrative records implying that measurement error is likely
contained. Firm data also come from administrative records (balance sheets). Employed
3Banks et al. (2001) interact the residual earnings variance with a measure of θ (the squared
wealth/income ratio), and hence their estimate is free from the second problem.
4Note that if only because of self-insurance, it is natural to expect firm volatility to be a more powerful
instrument for residual earnings volatility than for realized consumption volatility.
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workers can be matched with their employer and with measures of the firm performance for
all years they are observed in employment. Because we use firm performance volatility as
an instrument for earnings volatility we limit our sample to individuals employed in private
firms.
3.1 Measuring consumption
The Norwegian administrative data do not provide us with a direct measure of consumption.
Instead, we follow Fagereng and Halvorsen (2015) and impute it using the budget identity:
cit = (y
d
it −Δait)/nit, where ydit is the sum of all income sources (including capital income)
net of taxes, and ait is liquid assets (since information on housing wealth is incomplete). We
deflate consumption by the OECD equivalence scale n = (1 + 0.7(A− 1) + 0.5K), where A
is the number of adults and K the number of children (aged less than 18) in the household.
This measure adjusts for capital gains and losses by use of broad domestic and foreign stock
market indices, but likely suffers from some measurement error. Examples are extreme
observations that may occur in household-year observations where the household has been
involved in a real estate transaction, extreme returns from financial markets or when the
household is a business owner or a farmer. Excluding such observations and using the crude
adjustment for capital gains and losses alleviate the problem of measurement error. However,
issues related to the yearly nature of our data, such as intra-year trading in stocks, and to
housing transactions and marriage/divorce dynamics, remain. For this reason, we focus on
a sample where exclude extreme values of consumption growth.5
4 Methodology
We measure firm j performance with its value added, V Ajt, and assume its log evolves
according to the process
ln V Ajt = X
′
jtϕ+Qjt + f
T
jt
Qjt = Qjt−1 + fPjt
5We choose an asymmetric trimming, excluding the bottom 2.5% and top 1% of observations because our
measure of consumption is total expenditures, including durable purchases. Hence, occasionally one sees big
increases in expenditures. To further limit imputation error we retain only households with consumption
levels above a minimum threshold (around USD 10,000 following the government guidelines for social financial
support).
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where Xjt is a vector of observables that captures the predictable component of firm’s per-
formance. The stochastic component is the residual Qjt + f
T
jt , the sum of a random walk
component Qjt with permanent shock f
P
jt and a transitory shock component f
T
jt .
We model the earnings yijt (in logs) of worker i in firm j as a linear function of a vector of
workers’ observed characteristics, Zijt, and an idiosyncratic unexplained residual ωijt. The
latter is the sum of an individual random walk and a transitory component, plus a component
that depends on the firm shocks (transitory and permanent) with transmission coefficients
λT and λP , reflecting partial wage insurance within the firm.6 Hence:
ln yijt = Z
′
ijtγ+ωijt
= Z′ijtγ+vit + λ
P fPjt + λ
T fTjt
where vit is an individual unobserved component (the sum of a random walk permanent
component and an i.i.d. transitory shock). The term vit may in part be predictable by the
consumer (though not by the econometrician) and not constitute a source of earnings risk.
The firm component instead qualifies as earnings risk. We assume the two components are
independent. Hence, if earnings risk V˜ yit is measured by the variance of ωijt it will reflect both
true risk and “noise”. For firm-related shocks to matter, λT and λP must be economically
and statistically significant: i.e., firms must pass over to the workers some of the shocks to
their performance and not offer them full wage insurance.
Following Guiso et al. (2005) methodology, Fagereng et al. (2016) use Norwegian data
and obtain estimates of λP and λT of 0.071 and 0.018, respectively, both strongly statistically
significant. Thus, both transitory and permanent shocks to firm performance are partly
passed over to the worker but the pass-through is much stronger for permanent shocks,
consistent with intuition. We replicate this methodology here.
To have a reasonably long series of earnings volatility measures, we compute the overall
variance of unexplained workers earnings growth over T periods using rolling averages: V˜ yit =∑T−1
s=0 ω
2
ijt−s
T
(and set T = 5). We use this measure when estimating the Euler equation (4). Our
instruments are the variances of the unexplained firm value added growth - both permanent
and transitory - computed over the same T periods:
6These processes fit the data quite well (see Fagereng et al. (2016)).
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F Pjt =
∑T−1
s=0 gjt−s(gjt−s−1 + gjt−s + gjt−s+1)
T
F Tjt =
∑T−1
s=0 gjt−sgjt−s+1
T
where gjt = Δ(ln V Ajt −X′jtϕ).
5 Results
Table 1 shows the results of the IV estimates of the Euler equations (4) and (2). 7 To eliminate
outliers, we trim the variances of firm shocks at the 1st and 99th percentile. Our estimation
sample contains about 327,000 observations. As additional controls we include a set of year
fixed effects (to account for changes in interest rates), a quadratic in age, the change in the
number of children and years of schooling.
Table 1: IV estimates of the effect of wage and consumption risk on the growth of consump-
tion
Δln cit
Endogenous: V˜yit V˜cit
IV: 0.650*** 1.008***
(0.233) (0.310)
F-stat 1st stage 294.854 7.853
Kleibergen-Paap underid p-value 0.000 0.001
Hansen J-test p-value 0.029 0.396
Observations 327,518 327,518
Notes : The table reports IV estimates (see Table A2 in the Appendix for full first stage regressions) of the marginal effect of
wage and consumption risk on the growth of consumption, using two instruments - the variance of transitory and permanent
shocks to firm’s value added. All regressions include year fixed effects, a quadratic in age, the change in the number of
children, and years of schooling. F-stat for the power of the instruments is shown at the bottom of the table. Clustered
standard errors are in brackets. Coefficient significance: *** at 1 % or less; ** at 5 %; * at 10 %.
The first column shows the estimates of the earnings-variance Euler equation (eq. (4)).
The effect of earnings volatility is estimated to be 0.65, and is highly statistically significant.
This is joint evidence of a precautionary savings motive and of consumers’ inability to fully
7Table A1 (in the Appendix) provides summary statistics of the main variables in the analyses. It is worth
noticing that the variance of consumption growth and the variance of residual income are not comparable.
While the latter measures variability in income after filtering the predictable component, the former reflects
both predictable and unpredictable variation.
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self-insure wage risk. The F test from the first stage (value 294.9) reveals that the instru-
ments are quite powerful. Table A2 (in the Appendix) shows the full first stage regression.
The second column shows the estimate of the consumption-variance Euler equation (eq. (2)).
The IV estimate is now 1.01, significant at the 1% level and larger than the estimate in the
first column. As anticipated, the power of the instruments is lower when estimating this
Euler equation than the one in the first column, though the test (value 7.8) is not far from
conventional levels denoting non-weak instruments. In fact, in the first stage regression both
instruments have predictive power on observed consumption volatility, but much more the
variance of persistent shocks to the firm than that of the transitory ones (see Appendix).
This is reasonable as the former are more easily self-insured than the latter.
From the estimates reported in the second column we infer a degree of prudence - mea-
suring the strength of the precautionary motive - of around 2, which is reasonable. Using
jointly the estimates reported in the first and second column, we infer a value of θ = 0.64 -
i.e. little less than 2/3 of the earnings risk results in undesired fluctuations in consumption,
while consumers manage to self-insure the remaining 1/3.
Finally, we can use our estimates to assess the precautionary savings response to an
increase in earnings risk when the latter originates from a change in the role of the firm as
an insurance provider. Suppose that, following a trend documented by Benabou and Tirole
(2016), firms offer more high-powered wage contracts and start sharing permanent shocks
equally with their workers. That, is the value of λP increases from 0.07 to 0.5. Holding
constant the self insurance parameter at 0.64, we calculate that consumption growth would
be higher by 0.45 percentage points. If the firm shares equally also transitory shocks, the
consumption profile would increase at a much faster rate of 0.8 percentage points.
6 Conclusion
Building on a credible instrument for consumption risk, we develop a strategy that allows
to identify simultaneously the strength of the precautionary motive and the degree of self-
insurance of labor income risk. At the same time, it provides a framework for studying the
precautionary savings response of structural changes in wage insurance provided by the firm.
We find a strong precautionary motive, a partial ability to self-insure labor income risk and
a large precautionary savings response to firm adoption of high powered wage contracts.
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Appendix
In this appendix we first prove the inconsistency of OLS estimates of Euler equation (2)
and then the consistency of the IV estimate using as instruments the variances of the firm
permanent and transitory shocks. Lastly we provide summary statistics of the estimation
sample as well as first stages of the IV regressions.
A Bias of OLS and consistency of IV estimates of the
two Euler equations
Euler equation (1) (omitting the other controls and suppressing the i and t indexes) is
Δc = αVc + ζ
where α is the parameter of interest, Vc is the conditional variance of consumption growth,
and ζ is the consumption innovation.
Consumption risk is related to income risk plus other types of risk that don’t depend on
labor market:
Vc = θVy + Vη
where θ < 1 means there is some (self-)insurance.
There are two ”measurement” error problems. The first is that we observe consumption
volatility and wage volatility, not consumption risk and wage risk. In particular:
V˜c = Vc + ξ
where V˜c = (Δc)
2, Vc = E
(
(Δc)2
)
and ξ is the innovation in the consumption variance.
Moreover, the (residual) wage variance is:
V˜y = H + ρfF
But part of the H variability is not risk, but choice, so wage risk is really:
Vy = ρhH + ρfF
What people typically use is V˜y = Vy + ε, where ε = (1− ρh) H.
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An OLS regression of Δc on V˜c (Euler equation (2)) has a classical measurement error
problem:
cov
(
Δc, V˜c
)
var
(
V˜c
) = cov
(
αV˜c + ζ − αξ, V˜c
)
var
(
V˜c
)
= α− α
cov
(
ξ, V˜c
)
var
(
V˜c
)
= α
var (Vc)
var
(
V˜c
)
< α
An OLS regression of Δc on V˜y (Euler equation (2)) yields :
cov
(
Δc, V˜y
)
var
(
V˜y
) = cov (αVc + ζ,H + ρfF )
var (H + ρfF )
=
cov (α (θVy + Vη) + ζ,H + ρfF )
var (H + ρfF )
=
cov (α (θ (ρvH + ρfF ) + Vη) + ζ,H + ρfF )
var (H + ρfF )
=
cov (αθρvH + αθρfF + αVη + ζ,H + ρfF )
var (H + ρfF )
= αθ
ρhVH + ρ
2
fVF
VH + ρ2fVF
< αθ
which does not identify α both because of the measurement error and because of the
presence of self-insurance.
The IV regression of Euler equation (2) that uses the firm variance as an instrument fixes
the measurement error problem but not the sufficient statistics problem:
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cov (Δc, F )
cov
(
V˜y, F
) = cov (αVc + ζ, F )
cov (H + ρfF, F )
=
cov (α (θVy + Vη) + ζ, F )
cov (H + ρfF, F )
=
cov (α (θ (ρhH + ρfF ) + Vη) + ζ, F )
cov (H + ρfF, F )
=
cov (αθρhH + αθρfF + αVη + ζ, F )
cov (H + ρfF, F )
=
αθρfVF
ρfVF
= αθ
The IV on Euler equation (2) that uses the firm-related variances as instruments for
realized consumption volatility corrects the bias and identifies α:
cov (Δc, F )
cov
(
V˜c, F
) = cov (αVc + ζ, F )
cov
(
V˜c, F
)
=
cov (α (θVy + Vη) + ζ, F )
cov (θVy + Vη + ξ, F )
=
cov (α (θ (ρhH + ρfF ) + Vη) + ζ, F )
cov (θ (ρhH + ρfF ) + Vη + ξ, F )
=
cov (αθρhH + αθρfF + αVη + ζ, F )
cov (θρhH + θρfF + Vη + ξ, F )
=
αθρfVF
θρfVF
= α
Hence, jointly the IV estimates of Euler equation (1) and (2) allow to identify α and θ.
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B Additional Tables
Table A1: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev.
cict 32,554.6 22,100.22
Δ ln cit 0.056 0.485
V˜cit 0.238 0.408
V˜yit 0.043 0.087
F Tjt 0.021 0.065
FPjt 0.029 0.07
Years of education 12.905 2.368
Fraction married 0.457 0.498
Male 0.815 0.388
Age 46.199 8.743
Year 2005.9 2.563
Family size 2.306 1.345
Children 0.634 0.973
Notes : The table reports summary statistics for the estimation sample of 327,518 individuals. Values in 2011 USD.
Table A2: First stages of IV regressions
V˜y V˜c
F Tit 0.0510*** 0.0290**
(0.0024) (0.0111)
FPit 0.0270*** 0.0324***
(0.0021) (0.0103)
Year FE Yes Yes
Age polynomial Yes Yes
Δ children Yes Yes
Years of education Yes Yes
Observations 327,518 327,518
Notes : The table reports the first stages of the IV estimates in Table 1 of the marginal effect of wage and consumption risk on
the growth of consumption, using two instruments - the variance of transitory and permanent shocks to firm’s value added.
Clustered standard errors are in brackets. Coefficient significance: *** at 1 % or less; ** at 5 %; * at 10 %.
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